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The revelation that Volkswagen had employed an illegal “defeat device” to comply 
with regulation, but fundamentally side-step some emission controls during real-
world driving, has thrust the issue of regulatory non-compliance into the spotlight. A 
growing base of evidence has indicated that one of the underlying reasons for the 
observed emissions discrepancies, and subsequently the Volkswagen Scandal, is 
shortcomings in regulatory compliance protocols. This has raised questions about the 
efficacy of the United States and European Union regulatory frameworks for vehicle 
emissions, which both incorporated elements of performance based regulation, albeit 
with nuanced applications differing in terms of their enforcement and monitoring 
activities. Scholars have often argued that performance-based regulation can only be 
as good as a regulator’s ability to monitor outcomes, however, this research argues 
that that performance-based regulation can only be as good as a regulator’s ability to 
enforce outcomes. Building on from the scholarly evidence that links regulatory 
design to regulatory outcomes, this research will ask: to what extent can the different 
responses of the United States and the European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal be 
explained by their different applications of performance-based regulation? Using a 
triangulation of evidence from government documents –including documents from the 
recently established European Parliament Committee on Emissions Measurements in 
the Automotive Sector-, non-government documents, and semi-structured interviews, 
this research uses a process tracing approach to explain that the different responses of 
the United States and the European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal can be 
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Ambient Air Pollution – AAP 
 
Auxiliary Emission Control Device - AECD 
 
California Air Resources Board - CARB 
 
Carbon Dioxide – CO2 
 
Clean Air Act – CAA 
 
Conformity of Production – CoP 
 
Department of Transport (UK) - DoT 
 
European Environment Agency - EEA 
 
European Commission – EC 
 
European Commission Joint Research Centre - JRC 
 
European Parliament – EP 
 
European Parliament Committee on Emissions Measurements in the Automotive 
Sector - EMIS 
 
European Union – EU 
 
Federal Test Procedure – FTP 75 
 
Federal Trade Commission – FTC 
 
Heavy-Duty Vehicles – HDV 
 
International Council on Clean Transportation – ICCT  
 
In-service conformity - ISC 
 
Light Duty Vehicles – LDV 
 
Most Similar Systems Design - MSSD 
 
New European Driving Cycle - NEDC 
 
Nitrogen Oxides - NOx 
 
Original Equipment Manufacturer - OEM 
 
Performance-based Regulation - PBR 
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Portable Emissions Measurement System – PEMS 
 
Real-Driving Emissions – RDE 
 
Technical Committee for Motor Vehicles - TCMV 
 
Technical Service - TS 
 
Type-Approval Authority -TAA 
 
United States of America – U.S. 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency – USEPA 
 
Volkswagen – VW 
 
Volkswagen AG – VWAG 
 
Vehicle Certification Agency - VCA 
 
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. – VW US 
 
West Virginia University – WVU 
 




























Audi AG - owned by Volkswagen since 1969 and produces Volkswagen vehicles. 
Cycle beating – The predictable pattern (or “cycle”) of transient speeds versus time 
that allow engineers to optimise emissions that pass certification tests, but do not 
necessarily have these pollution levels when driving “normally.” 
Defeat device – A software algorithm (switch) that senses whether the vehicle is 
being tested, so that it can adjust its emissions profile to conform to certification 
testing criteria. 
European Commission - independent of national governments and its job is to 
represent and uphold the interests of the European Union as a whole. It drafts 
proposals for new European laws, which it presents to the European Parliament and 
the Council. It is also the EU's executive arm, responsible for implementing the 
decisions of Parliament and the Council, implementing its policies, running its 
programmes and spending its funds 
European Council – Comprises of the representatives of each of the 28 member 
states at Ministerial level. 
European Parliament - the only directly-elected body of the European Union, with 
elections every five years. The Parliament has members from the 28 member states 
and, along with the Council, it considers legislative proposals from the European 
Commission. The Parliament and Council also share joint responsibility for approving 
the EU's annual budget. 
Performance-based Regulation – A regulatory approach that focuses on desired, 
measurable outcomes, rather than prescriptive processes, techniques, or procedures. 
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Type Approval - the process applied by national authorities to certify that a model of 
a certain vehicle (or a vehicle type) meets all safety, environmental and production 
requirements before authorising it to be placed on the market 
Volkswagen AG - headquartered in Wolfsburg, Germany and is one of the world’s 
leading automobile manufacturers and the largest carmaker in Europe. This is the 
parent company of Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Volkswagen Group of 
America Chattanooga, LLC, and Audi AG. Audi, Bentley, Bugatti, Lamborghini, 
Porsche, SEAT, Škoda, and Volkswagen. 
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. - a wholly owned subsidiary of Volkswagen 
AG. It operates a manufacturing plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee and houses the U.S. 
























Air pollution exposure is regarded as one of the world’s greatest health risks, and 
consequently six criteria pollutants have been identified as particularly problematic 
(nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, sulphur dioxide, and 
lead). In 2012 around 7 million people died as a result of air pollution exposure, with 
ambient air pollution (AAP) being responsible for 3.7 million of these deaths (WHO, 
2014). Vehicles are a major source of AAP exposure in developed countries, due to 
their ubiquity and the proximity of the exhaust emission to people. Despite the overall 
trend of stricter vehicle emissions regulation -as demonstrated in Table 1 and 2 for 
nitrogen oxides (NOx)1 standards [one of the criteria pollutants] – these regulations 
are failing to reduce levels of AAP, due to the increasing vehicle population and the 
failure of vehicles to meet regulatory requirements during normal driving conditions. 










                  Table 1: (EEA, 2016)                                               Table 2: (USEPA, 1999) 
																																																								
1 NOx is defined as being a combination of all nitrogen oxides: including nitric oxide (NO), nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2), and nitrous oxides (N2O). 
EU Standard Year Nitrogen 
Oxides 
(NOx) 
EURO 1 1992 - 
EURO 2 1996 - 
EURO 3 2000 0.50 
EURO 4 2005 0.25 
EURO 5 2009 0.18 
EURO 6 2014 0.08 
U.S. Standard Year Nitrogen 
Oxides (NOx) 
Tier 0 1987 1.0 
Tier 1 1994 0.60 





A number of recent studies have identified the discrepancy between laboratory-
based type approval test results and “real-world”, on-road, emission levels as being 
responsible for the increasing gap in predicted improvement in AAP (Franco, Posada, 
German, & Mock, 2014). For example, in the stark differences between reported and 
“real-world” vehicle NOx emissions for EU regulated diesel vehicles -despite the 
overall trend of improvement- in which the cloud size provides a good visual 
representation of the magnitude of the issue (see Image 1). 
Image 1: Difference between emissions limits and on-road measured values (Carslaw, Beevers, Tate, 
Westmoreland, & Williams, 2011; Franco, Sánchez, German, & Mock, 2014). 
 
This “real-world” vehicle NOx emissions incongruity became a matter of public 
concern with Volkswagen Group’s (VW AG) admission that it had employed an 
illegal “defeat device” to meet regulatory criteria in the laboratory, but bypass this 
emission abatement during “real-world” driving scenarios (Carder, Thompson, Besch, 
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Thiruvegadam, & Kappanna, 2014). The “defeat device” in question can be 
understood as a software algorithm (switch) that activates on one or more sensor 
inputs: 
 
“The “switch” senses whether the vehicle is being tested or not based on 
various inputs including the position of the steering wheel, vehicle speed, 
the duration of the engine’s operation, and barometric pressure” 
(USEPA, 2015a). 
 
Essentially, this means that if the vehicle’s software algorithm calculated that 
an official approval test was being carried out, the vehicle would adjust its emissions 
profile to meet regulatory criteria. Whereas, at other times (for example, on road) the 
vehicle would switch to a different emissions mapping to optimise another 
performance characteristic (for example, fuel economy). This resulted in “real-
world” NOx emissions increasing by a factor of 10 to 40 times above the EPA 
regulated levels (USEPA, 2015a).2 
 
The “defeat device” discovered in VW AG 2.0 litre and 3.0 litre diesel 
vehicles3 impacted some 11 million cars worldwide, with approximately 500,000 of 
these in the United States of America (U.S.) and 8 million in the European Union 
(EU) (VW, 2015). In the context of regulatory efforts to mitigate the harmful effects 
of AAP, and in a political climate that was preparing for COP21, this revelation was 
particularly damaging, as the modified software reduced the effectiveness of 																																																								
2 Note that off cycle emissions at operating conditions outside the regulatory test cycles can still result 
in higher emissions, even without a proactive “defeat device”, and is well understood in the scientific 
community (See	Weiss, et al., 2011). 
3 See Appendix D for list of affected vehicles. 
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technology to reduce NOx, a pollutant that can cause a host of respiratory diseases, 
including emphysema, and bronchitis (Gates, Ewing, Russell, & Watkins, 2016). 
 
The magnitude of the regulatory failure in the fallout of the Volkswagen (VW) 
Scandal has resulted in a regulatory discontinuity, as environmentalists push for 
stricter regulations, economies fluctuate, and the fate of one of the world’s largest car 
manufacturers hangs in the balance, all whilst regulatory bodies are doing their due 
diligence to try and understand how such activities were able to happen, moreover, 
how they were able to go undetected for such a prolonged period of time. A growing 
base of evidence indicates that one of the underlying reasons for this regulatory 
failure was shortcomings in the compliance protocols that determine how emission 
levels are monitored and how penalties are imposed (Cognlianese, 2015; Franco, 
Sánchez, German, & Mock, 2014; ICCT, 2015a; Transport & Environment, 2016).  
 
Following the Scandal, VW has recorded its biggest ever annual loss of $1.6 
billion (McGee & Campbell, 2016), and seen high profile resignations from its Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), Martin Winterkorn, as well as its head of operations in the 
U.S., Michael Horn. More recently, the Scandal has reached the upper echelons of 
the VW corporate structure, with the allegations that the new CEO, Matthias Müller, 
was involved in “a willful and systematic scheme of cheating” (State of NY, and NY 
State Department of Environmental Conservation, v VW AG; Audi AG; VW USA.; 
Porsche AG; Porsche; and Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 2016). 
 
The extent of VW’s punishment is yet to be finalised, however, VW has set 
aside $17.9 billion for costs related to the Scandal, with $14.7 billion already agreed 
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with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to compensate customers owning affected 2.0 litre 
vehicles. VW continues to face legal challenges, including civil and criminal 
investigations in the U.S., Germany, and other EU countries (Gates, Ewing, Russell, 
& Watkins, 2016). 
 
The VW Scandal as part of the wider “dieselgate” has put diesel engines in 
general under closer public scrutiny, and subsequently several other car 
manufacturers have been demonstrated to have a similar discrepancy to VW between  
 “real-world” and the laboratory NOx emissions results, including Renault, 
Mitsubishi, Nissan, and General Motors. For example, a French government report in 
2016 investigated 86 different cars, discovering that only 20% complied with 
regulatory emissions criteria during “real-world” driving, with some emitting as 
much as 17 times the regulated levels (Ministère de l’Environnement, 2016). Despite 
“dieselgate” being a phenomenon that extends further than just the actions of VW, 
this study will focus solely on VW, for a few important reasons. Firstly as the 
marquee case of “dieselgate” VW’s actions have a much larger consequence for 
international regulatory regimes, and economies. Secondly, VW is the only 
manufacturer to begin to reach formal settlements with regulators, and thus can offer 
a deeper understanding of the relationship between the regulated and the regulatory 
authority, throughout the regulatory cycle. 
 
This study will focus on the regulatory structures, and response of the EU and 
U.S. for a few important reasons. Firstly, the EU and U.S. can be regarded as the de 
facto global standard developers for vehicle emissions, therefore it makes analytical 
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sense to investigate how these regulatory authorities operate in the context of the VW 
Scandal. Moreover, the overwhelmingly majority of the affected vehicles are in these 
regions. Notwithstanding, both the EU and U.S. apply the same type of regulation, 
performance-based regulation (albeit with nuanced applications), which raises 
questions why they had such different responses to the Scandal. In this context, this 
research seeks to understand “To what extent can the different responses of the 
United States and the European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal be explained by 
their different applications of performance-based regulation? 
 
This study will be organised into five chapters: Literature Review; 
Methodology; Discussion; Conclusion; and the Recommendations For The Future. 
The Literature Review chapter will define terms, position the research within the 
academic and scientific literature, as well as the VW context. The Methodology 
chapter will outline the hypothesis, null hypothesis, and counter hypothesis, as well as 
the processes used for data collection, analysis, and interpretation,. The Discussion 
Chapter will describe the regulatory context before the Scandal, detailing the type 
approval processes, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the different 
responses of the U.S. and the EU. It will then use a process tracing approach to both 
describe the VW Scandal and evaluate causal claims that the different responses of 
the EU and the U.S. to the VW Scandal be explained by their different applications of 
performance-based regulation: specifically enforcement capabilities. The fifth chapter 
is the Conclusion, this will summarise the discussions in the previous chapter, and re-
evaluate the hypotheses. The Recommendations For The Future Chapter will attempt 




This literature review will define the key concepts that will be used in this study, 
determining what is meant by compliance, why firms comply (or do not), the different 
types of regulatory design, and the different methods that regulators use to induce 
compliance. In the context of the VW Scandal in the EU and the U.S., this literature 
review will explain how they differ in their regulatory structure, and application of 
methods used to induce compliance. 
 
Compliance generally means confirming to a rule. Regulatory compliance, 
therefore means conforming to a regulation. For vehicle manufacturers, this challenge 
can be best understood by looking at the –often conflicting- goals of regulatory 
bodies, of both forcing best available technology (BAT)4  to increase vehicle’s 
performance, largely by improving fuel economy, and reducing carbon dioxide (CO2), 
NOx, and other pollutants. In this context, vehicle manufacturers are supposed to 
design their practices to make sure they are not only meeting stated regulatory 
requirements (i.e. emissions levels), but also the “spirit of the regulation” (i.e. forcing 
BAT, and moreover, maintaining emissions levels during real-world driving). Non-
compliance to these standards results in undesired consequences, such as defective 
goods, environmental negative externalities, and punitive sanctions from regulatory 
authorities. 
 
 																																																								4	BAT is enshrined in the U.S. regulation (Clean Air Act of 1990, section 169[3]), and in the EU as the 
BATNEEC (best available techniques not entailing excessive costs) principle (Directive 2010/75/EU).	
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To ensure regulatory compliance, regulatory authorities use two tools: 
monitoring and enforcement. Monitoring, which can be understood simply as 
oversight, can come in the form of police patrols (centralised, active, and direct 
monitoring) or fire alarms (rules, procedures, and informal practices that allow 
individuals or organised interest groups to monitor) (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). 
Enforcement, on the other hand, is forcing a company to do something that they 
would otherwise not do (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). Enforcement can come in the form 
of warnings, administrative sanctions (such as fiscal penalties), criminal sanctions, or 
even incarceration or revocation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). 
 
Attempts to understand why firms comply –or do not comply- with regulation 
has received significant attention from scholars, resulting in a multitude of 
responsible explanatory factors, ranging from the nature of the regulated activity 
(Gunningham, 1974); motivations of the firm (Haas, 1998, Rees, 1988); inadvertent 
reasons such as difficulty understanding regulation or uncertainty in how to develop a 
policy response to meet regulatory targets (Chayes & Chayes, 1995; Mitchell 1994); 
or more broadly, the regulatory context (Coglianese, 2003, 2015; Hutter, 1989, 1997; 
Lodge & Wegrich 2012; May, 2003).  
 
The VW Scandal has rightly raised questions about the motivations and efficacy 
of the firm, including the character of VW’s management, and its corporate culture. 
However, this research will focus on the effect of regulatory context upon regulatory 
compliance, for a few important reasons. Firstly, the opinion of expert bodies such as 
the ICCT that the regulatory framework (how emissions levels are monitored and 
enforced) was a core reason for the NOx discrepancies provides a good platform for an 
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academic foray into testing these claims. Secondly, when you consider the nuanced 
application of their regulatory frameworks, which are very similar (to be explained in 
further later), it raises interesting questions about why there was a dichotomy in 
response. Finally, with the word constraint that is placed upon this research, it could 
not possibly do analytical justice to all explanatory factors. 
 
REGULATORY CONTEXT 
Classically, there are two approaches to designing a regulatory framework, a 
“Command and Control” approach and forms of “Self-Regulation.” “Command and 
Control” regulation includes a clear fixed standard backed by criminal sanctions 
(Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). Despite its historically dominant policy position, partly due 
to its simplicity, it is subjected to a barrage of disparagement on the basis of it being 
inefficient, costly, stifling innovation, inviting enforcement difficulties, and focusing 
on ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Gunningham, Grabosky & 
Sinclair 1998; Hutter 1997). These critiques are widely shared by policy-makers in the 
EU and the U.S., and attempts to remedy the inadequacies of the “Command and 
Control” approach have driven a paradigm shift that has seen an increased use of 
forms of “self-regulation”, particularly in the environmental domain (Coglianese, 
Nash, & Olmstead, 2003). 
 
 “Self-Regulation” delegates rule-making power to the regulated company, with 
the idea being that the regulator can rely on a close relationship between itself and the 
regulated to deliver public goals (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). Favoured for its 
decentralisation and subsequent reduce of ‘red-tape’ and administrative cost, it is 
deemed more flexible, providing incentives for firms to find their own solutions (Hahn 
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& Stavins, 2016). However, such ‘light-touch’ regulation is considered to go hand-in-
hand with a regulatory inability to monitor (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012; May, 2003). In 
reality, most regulatory systems will contain elements of both “Command and 
Control”, and “Self-Regulation”, however, for ease of analysis, the distinction is 
helpful (Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair 1998). 
 
ENFORCEMENT VS MANAGEMENT 
Dependent on the overarching regulatory structure (“Command and Control”, or “Self-
Regulation”), there are conflicting ideas about how best to address non-compliance. 
Tallberg (2002) aptly demonstrates this divide, identifying two schools of thought for 
addressing non-compliance: enforcement and management mechanisms. 
 
 The enforcement approach (see Dorn & Fulton, 1997; Downs, Rocke, & 
Barsoom 1996; Haas, 1998) is profoundly influenced by the political economy 
tradition of game theory, and collective action theory (see Axelrod 1984; Olson 1965), 
where the marginal benefits of regulatory compliance can be understood as a simple 
cost benefit analysis: are the expected value of sanctions avoided more or less than the 
probability of being discovered (monitoring), and magnitude of penalties? 
(enforcement) (Brehm & Hamilton, 1996; Haas, 1998). Compliance problems are 
therefore best mitigated by increasing the likelihood and penalties of detection through 
monitoring and enforcement activities (Tallberg, 2002). This approach tends to be 
heavily administered under “Command and Control” regulatory structures. 
 
 The management approach (see Chayes & Chayes, 1995; Haas, Keohane, & 
Levy 1993; Mitchell 1994; Young, 1992) contends that firms have a general 
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predisposition to comply with regulation, due to considerations of efficiency, interests, 
and norms. Non-compliance, when it happens, is not the result of an amoral 
calculation, rather an effect of capacity limitations and rule ambiguity. Therefore, non-
compliance is best mitigated through a problem-solving strategy of capacity building, 
rule interpretation, and transparency, rather than through coercive enforcement 
(Tallberg, 2002). This approach tends to be heavily administered under “Self-
Regulation” regulatory structures. In reality, enforcement and management 
mechanisms can be complimentary, and most regulatory frameworks incorporate 
elements of both. Whilst this divide in scholarly literature is largely concerned with 
the effectiveness of regulatory design, and how best to solve issues of non-compliance, 
it provides the theoretical background for why policy-makers choose certain 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION IN THE EU AND THE U.S. 
Both the EU and U.S. have harboured performance-based regulation (PBR) as a form 
of “Self-Regulation” to legislate for vehicle emissions. Vehicle emissions can be 
regarded as a standard application of PBR: The regulator sets a limit –an emissions 
standard- but then it allows the manufacturer to innovate as it sees fit to stay below 
this limit (Coglianese, 2015), and moreover, report the compliance to the regulator. 
 
The growing base of evidence indicating that one of the underlying reasons for 
the observed emissions discrepancies is shortcomings in the compliance protocols that 
determine how emission levels are monitored and how penalties are imposed raises 
questions about the efficacy of PBR for vehicle emissions in the EU and U.S. Much 
has been done to assess the usefulness of PBR, with them being extensively praised by 
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academics and policy makers (Bennear & Cognlianese, 2012; Coglianese, Nash, & 
Olmstead, 2003). However, Coglianese (2015) notes that performance-based 
regulation can only be as good as a regulator’s ability to monitor outcomes. However, 
less has been done to understand the other element of ensuring regulatory compliance, 
enforcement. 
 
Despite both the EU and the U.S. incorporating PBR into its regulatory 
framework for vehicle emissions, they have differing applications in terms of their 
monitoring and enforcement activities. The fundamental differences between the EU 
and U.S. enforcement and management structures is well explained by the ICCT: 
 
“It is not the vehicle testing per se, but rather the strong focus on 
independent conformity testing coupled with enforcement authority, 
something that is prevalent in the U.S. In the EU, by contrast, this element 
of independent re-testing is largely absent from the regulations, and the 
involved regulatory bodies are more restricted with respect to their 
enforcement authority” (ICCT, 2015a).   
 
CONTRIBUTION 
Much has already been done to evaluate the costs and benefits of regulatory design 
(“Command and Control” vs. “Self-Regulation”), of inducing compliance 
(enforcement v management), as well as PBR. In the VW Scandal context, the 
differences between the EU and U.S. application of PBR, in terms of monitoring and 
enforcement, has been well described (see ICCT, 2015a), however, there is yet to be a 
study to investigate whether this different application of PBR can explain the different 
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responses of the EU and the U.S. to the VW Scandal.  
 
This research will fill this knowledge gap, and go further into the theory of 
regulatory systems, by looking at the application of PBR for vehicle emissions 
(specifically enforcement and monitoring activities) to understand whether it can 
explain regulatory outcomes. Scholars have often pointed to PBR’s effectiveness 
depending on ability to monitor compliance. This study will argue that PBR can only 































Building on the gaps in the literature -a dearth of research studying if changes in 
regulatory design (particularly the application of PBR) can affect the actions of 
regulatory bodies- this paper will use a small-N comparative case study methodology: 
comparative spatially (EU and U.S.), but temporally constant (the VW Scandal). The 
case study structure will be under the auspices of a Most Similar Systems Design 
(MSSD) to compare the EU and U.S., as they are accepted to share many important 
characteristics, including political (federal, democracy), economic (in GDP $16.23 
trillion and $17.95 trillion respectively), social (respect for human rights), and 
population size (510 million and 321 million respectively) (The World Bank, 2016).  
 
In terms of vehicle emissions regulation, an MSSD design is also appropriate, as 
the EU and U.S. regulatory frameworks –incorporating PBR - are similar, only 
differing in regard to their focus on independent conformity testing and enforcement 
procedures. Thus, the selection of cases for both the spatial dimension (EU & U.S.), 
and the regulatory framework, is based on the independent variables, -those that are 
similar- not on the dependent variable. This enables the independent variables to act 
as a control, and will subsequently boost both internal and external validity (Halperin 
& Heath, 2012).  
 
Firstly, in beginning case study research, what the case study represents must be 
clearly defined. George and Bennett (2005) define a case as an “instance of a class of 
events”: this simply means a phenomenon of scientific interest. In this case, it is a 
case of regulatory non-compliance. 
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Building on the literature review, and the research question “To what extent can 
the different responses of the United States and the European Union to the 
Volkswagen Scandal be explained by their different applications of performance-
based regulation?” the hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis - the different responses of the United States and the European 
Union to the Volkswagen Scandal can be explained as a result of their 
application of performance based regulation: specifically enforcement 
capabilities. 
It follows that the competing hypothesis will be: 
Counter Hypothesis – the different responses of the United States and the 
European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal can be explained as a result of 
their application of performance based regulation: specifically monitoring 
capabilities. 
These two hypotheses will allow us to test the new theory (enforcement as the 
explanatory variable), and the existing theory (monitoring as the explanatory 
variable). Although before testing these hypotheses, we must demonstrate that there is 
a relationship between the dependent and independent variables. For this reason, this 
research will also use a null hypothesis, which is as follows: 
Null Hypothesis - the different responses of the United States and the 
European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal cannot be explained as a 
result of their application of performance based regulation. 
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In answering the research question the variables will be operationalised as 
follows. The dependent variable is the ‘Response to the VW Scandal’, meaning the 
actions of the EU and the U.S. regulatory authorities following the VW Scandal. The 
primary independent variable is ‘Application of Performance-based Regulation’ 
which is an amalgamation of two other independent variables: ‘Monitoring 
Capabilities’ and ‘Enforcement Capabilities.’ 
 
PROCESS TRACING 
Process tracing is an increasingly prominent methodology in political science, it has 
been used as a framework to explain the end of the Cold War (Evangelista, 2015), 
democratisation and the domestic sources of foreign policy (Adamson, 2001), and 
U.S. decision making in the 2003 intervention in Iraq (Lake, 2010). It has become an 
attractive methodology, as it can both describe phenomena and to evaluate causal 
inferences (Collier, 2011). Process tracing can serve as ‘an operational procedure for 
attempting to identify and verify the observable within-case implications of causal 
mechanisms’ (George and Bennett, 2005), and when used in conjunction with a 
small-N comparative case study (such as this) it can help the researcher to look at a 
case’s sequence and structure of events, to create a trail of evidence to demonstrate 
that the independent variable caused a certain response in the case. 
 
The ideas that guide applying process tracing to establishing causal inference 
can be understood in terms of four empirical tests5; “Hoop Test”6, “Smoking Gun 
																																																								
5 See Appendix C for detailed image of process tracing. 
6 The example that is given for a “hoop test” is: was the accused in the state on the day of the murder? 
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Test”7, “Doubly Decisive Test”8, and “Straw in the Wind Test”9 (van Evera, 1997). 
These tests are classified according to whether passing the test is necessary and/or 
sufficient for accepting the inference (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). Each test on its own 
is not very decisive, but a combination of tests increases confidence in a hypothesis, 
just as many pieces of evidence can find a suspect guilty (or innocent) (Bennett & 
Checkel, 2015; van Evera, 1997). Whilst it is of course vital to examine evidence 
through these tests, it is important to understand that these tests provide a framework 
for analysis, and are best used as informal heuristic devices.  
DATA COLLECTION – A “TRIANGULATION OF EVIDENCE” 
 
This research design will create a “triangulation of evidence” from multiple sources 
of data, and use multiple methods of data collection to find the intermediary variables 
that can help to understand how the independent variable ‘Application of 
Performance-based Regulation’ led to dependent variable ‘Response to the VW 
Scandal.’  
 
The first point of the triangle is government documents, specifically; reports, 
statements, position papers, regulations, and letters. This will include documents from 
–but will not be limited to- the EU institutions (Parliament, Commission, and 
Council), USEPA, California Air Resources Board (CARB), and national regulatory 
authorities in the EU (including Type Approval agencies), to create a broad range of 
																																																								
7 The example that is given for a “Smoking Gun Test”, a smoking gun in a suspect’s hands right after a 
murder strongly implicates that suspect, but the absence of such a smoking gun does not exonerate this 
suspect. 
8 The example that is given for the “Doubly Decisive Test” is a bank camera that catches the faces of 
all those involved in robbing the bank: To convict an individual in the robbery, it is both necessary and 
sufficient to show that their face matches the camera footage; to exonerate an individual, it is necessary 
and sufficient to show that their features do not match the bank video. 
9 The “Straw in the Wind Test” merely entails a hint of what is to come. It is the weakest of the four 
tests, and is normally the basis for furthering tests.	
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governmental agencies at regional, national, and international level, as well as 
enabling a study of diachronic changes in the regulation that can elucidate 
contemporary events. This point of the triangle will be strengthened through the use 
of an untapped data source in academic study based on this literature review: The 
European Parliament Committee on Emissions Measurements in the Automotive 
Sector (EMIS). EMIS, which was set up in December 2015 to “investigate in detail 
alleged contraventions and maladministration in relation to emission measurements in 
the automotive sector” (EP, 2015), contains in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders, as well as factual and technical information. 
 
The second point of the triangle is non-governmental documents, including; 
statements, letters, position papers, and policy recommendations. This will mainly 
include the statements and letters from VW, expert analyses and recommendations 
from key policy think tanks (such as the ICCT, and Transport & Environment), as 
well as academic insights from political science, environmental science, and 
automotive engineering. 
 
The third point of the triangle is semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders, including a Director at the USEPA Office of Transportation of Air 
Quality (US01), a Director specialising in Emissions at the main automotive lobbying 
and standards group in the EU (EU01), a Director of Emissions Development from a 
firm that has considerable experience in regulation drafting, compliance, and 
interactions with the USEPA (US02), as well as an Emissions testing expert heavily 
involved in the technical drafting of U.S. regulation (US03).10 This point of the 
																																																								
10 See Appendix A for list of interviewees. 
	28		
triangle of evidence is largely to gain factual information and perspective from U.S. 
stakeholders, as following the creation of EMIS, in depth interviews have been 
carried out in the EU. This information will be used to corroborate against any 
























Process tracing as a methodology for both describing phenomena and evaluating 
causal mechanisms is best applied when you take key synchronic events in a 
diachronic context. Thus, this study identifies three key events to test the hypotheses, 
explaining how the different applications of PBR led to different responses to the VW 
Scandal; the experiences of the USEPA in the 1990s; the legal language used to 
define defeat devices; and how the Scandal was discovered. This analysis will also 
trace the process after the event, looking at the post-scandal regulatory response of the 
EU, as this demonstrates ex post facto evidence. 
 
Before critically analysing the available evidence to understand to what extent 
the EU and U.S. responses to the VW Scandal can be explained by their applications 
of PBR, one must understand the regulatory context in which the VW Scandal 
occurred. Therefore, the following passage will describe the regulatory context of the 
EU and U.S., detailing their respective type approval processes, monitoring and 










THE UNITED STATES REGULATORY CONTEXT 
 
Automotive emissions regulations in the U.S. are centred on the 1970 Clean Air Act 
(CAA) -and its subsequent derivatives- which sets tailpipe emissions standards under 
the auspices of the executive agency of the USEPA. The CAA gives the USEPA the 
authority to type approve all new vehicles, to hold manufacturers accountable for 
vehicle’s ‘lifetime compliance’, and to monitor and enforce vehicle manufacturers. In 
the case of the VW Scandal, all of the affected vehicles in the U.S. were certified to 
the EPAs Tier 2, Bin 5 emissions standard11, and ran on the Federal Test Procedure 
cycle (FTP 75). 
 The U.S. type approval procedure comes under the moniker of vehicle 
selection and pre-production laboratory testing. The vehicle manufacturer will carry 
out its own emissions certification tests and report the figures to the USEPA, who will 
then carry out its own emissions tests to confirm the reported certification by the 
manufacturers. If a vehicle fails the test, a retest is permitted. If the vehicle fails again, 
no certificate will be issued unless the manufacturer rectifies the problem (ICCT, 
2015a). The U.S.’ compliance program can be best understood in Image 2. This 
details the U.S.’ monitoring capabilities. Key features include The “Selective 
Enforcement Audit”, where the regulator can test a vehicle straight from the assembly 
line, as well randomly test vehicles on the road with “In-Use Surveillance.” 
																																																								
11 U.S. emissions standards are divided into different ‘bins’ based on pollution levels, as emissions 
standards are based on fleet averages. Bin 5 has a NOx limit of 0.07 g/mi, which is equal to the fleet 
average NOx standard. Therefore, NOx emissions from vehicles certified to bins higher than bin 5 must 
be offset by selling a sufficient number of vehicles certified to bins lower than bin 5. See DieselNet, 
2006, for more information. 
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            Image 2: USEPA vehicle compliance program for light-duty vehicles (ICCT, 2015a)  
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THE EUROPEAN UNION REGULATORY CONTEXT 
 
Since 1992, EU legislation to type approve light-duty vehicles’ emissions has been 
based on laboratory tests on a chassis dynamometer, whilst the vehicle is driven over 
the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC). Tailpipe emissions are regulated under the 
“EURO” standard. In the EU, VW cars during the VW Scandal period were regulated 
under the EURO 5 emissions standard. 
 
The EU type approval framework is legislated for under Directive 2007/46/EC (see 
Image 3). European Commission Whole Vehicle Type Approval (ECWVTAC) may 
only be granted once the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) –in this case the 
vehicle manufacturer- has established conformity of production (CoP) to ensure that 
the vehicle complies at all stages with same specifications. Once a vehicle is type 
approved and receives a certificate of conformity (CoC), in-service conformity (ISC) 
can be used to monitor vehicles (EP, 2016). If it is then discovered that there is a 
substantial difference between type-approval emissions test results, and ISC checks, it 
can be brought to the attention of the manufacturer, although importantly, it has no 
legal consequences (ICCT, 2015a). 






























                  









                 Image 3: Type-approval process for new vehicles in the EU (EP, 2016)  
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 In the EU, manufacturers can choose to be type-approved in any of the 28 
member states, under the relevant type approval authority (TAA) [e.g. VCA]12, and 
with over 300 technical services (TS). These TS’ are contracted to the type-approval 
authorities to administer testing, and has led many to claim that this 
commercialisation of the certification process leads to a “race-to-the-bottom.” The 
most common procedure for larger manufacturers is to test a vehicle model in its own 
facilities and to have the TS witness the final test that is then used to obtain the 
ECWVTAC. Once a vehicle has its ECWVTAC, it is the responsibility of the member 
state TAA which has type-approved a vehicle to impose penalties for breach of the 
type-approval procedure. In the context of the VW Scandal, if it was to be determined 
that a type-approved vehicle had been modified to “cycle beat” using a “defeat 
device” it is the member state where the vehicle was type approved that would be 
responsible for imposing penalties (Article 30 of Directive 2007/46/EC); 
 
“If a Member State which has granted an EC type-approval finds that new 
vehicles do not conform to the type it has approved, it shall take the 
necessary measures, including, where necessary, the withdrawal of type-
approval, to ensure that production vehicles are brought into conformity 
with the approved type” (The European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2007a). 
 
The differences between the EU and U.S. regulatory frameworks for vehicle 
emissions are illustrated in Image 4 (see p.36). The key differences are that the U.S. 
system permits a “Selective Enforcement Audit”, where the regulator can test a vehicle 
																																																								
12 The Vehicle Certification Agency (VCA) is the UK type approval authority. 
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straight from the assembly line, as well randomly test vehicles on the road with “In-
Use Surveillance.” This juxtaposed to the state of affairs in the EU, which has no 
confirmatory testing, and where only some member states monitor in-use (although 
importantly with no legal consequences). 
 
DISCOVERY OF THE SCANDAL 
 
Beginning in 2009, VW began incorporating a new fuel delivery system to better 
control emissions. This used in combination with exhaust after treatment technologies 
(needed to meet the lower U.S. limit), either through selective catalytic reduction or a 
lean NOx trap, in combination with exhaust gas recirculation13, led VW to claiming 
that their 2009 model year vehicles not only met USEPA standards, but 
comprehensively bettered them, all whilst providing competitive product 
differentiation with improved fuel economy. In reality, the dichotomy between good 
fuel efficiency and NOx emissions levels in line with U.S. regulation was not 
achievable. Consequently, VW chose to activate a “defeat device” to switch from 
better fuel economy and higher NOx levels to a lower emission “compliant” mode 
when the vehicle’s software algorithm calculated that an official approval test was 
being carried out. 
																																																								
13 These technologies are explained further in MECA, 2007. 
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Image 4: Overview of the EU and U.S. vehicle emissions testing and enforcement schemes (ICCT, 
2015a) 
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The first indicators of an issue where discovered by the European Commission's 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) in 2011, using a Portable Emission Measurement System 
(PEMS) to analyse the on-road emissions of light-duty vehicle (LDV) diesels that 
were EURO 3-5 compliant (see Image 5 for an example PEMS). They discovered that 
the LDV diesels were dramatically exceeding NOx standards on the road, and warned  
European Commission (EC) officials that at least one car manufacturer was possibly 
using a NOx related “defeat device” to bypass emissions regulations (Weiss, et al., 
2011). Following this advice, the EC and the European member state governments 
could not agree who was responsible for taking action. 
Image 5: Picture courtesy of Sensors Inc., a leading supplier of PEMS equipment worldwide (see 
Sensors, 2016). 
The unearthing of the VW Scandal was somewhat of an accident. John German, 
the U.S. co-lead of the ICCT, had initially carried out PEMS tests in the EU and had 
found a pattern of data suggesting that diesel cars in Europe have high NOx emissions 
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(for example from the JRC), and in an attempt to improve the cleanliness of the 
European fleets, he decided to examine the U.S. (which has more stringent NOx 
standards). This was part of a plan to demonstrate the compliance in the U.S. and put 
pressure on European authorities to improve EU NOx standards. A group of 
researchers at WVU, led by Dr. Dan Carder, was awarded a contract from the ICCT 
to run tests on a few new diesel cars, and using PEMS, they took their cars out on the 
roads to simulate ordinary driving conditions (see Carder, Thompson, Besch, 
Thiruvegadam, & Kappanna, 2014). They discovered that the VWs were not running 
as cleanly as VW claimed, and subsequently passed the data over to CARB and the 
USEPA to let them investigate further. 
THE RESPONSES OF THE EU AND THE U.S. 
 
On September 18, 2015, as a result of WVU’s findings, the USEPA issued a 
notification of violation of the CAA, over the allegations that certain 2.0 litre models 
had been programmed to “circumvent EPA emissions standards for certain air 
pollutants” (USEPA, 2015a). This was followed by a second notice of violation of the 
CAA on November 2, 2015, as 3.0 litre VWs were alleged to have been fitted with a 
similar “defeat device” (USEPA, 2015b). Under the CAA 2.0 litre settlements, firstly 
with the FTC, VW will pay $10.033 billion towards class action lawsuits, and 
secondly Volkswagen will pay $2.7 billion to fully remediate the excess NOx 
emissions. In addition, the CAA 2.0 litre partial settlement will require VW to invest 
an additional $2 billion to promote the use of zero emission vehicles (USEPA, 2016). 
This does not include any remunerations for the 3.0 litre affected vehicles, criminal 
investigations, and from certain states (importantly including California, who are 
known to be particularly harsh in its punishment). More recently, three attorney 
generals (New York, Massachusetts, and Maryland) directly challenged VW’s 
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portrayal of the Scandal, with Eric Schneiderman, the NY State Attorney General 
suggesting that; 
 
“The decision to install defeat devices was not, however, made by ‘a 
couple of software engineers... Rather, it was the result of a willful and 
systematic scheme of cheating by dozens of employees at all levels of the 
company” (State of NY, and NY State Department of Environmental 
Conservation, v Volkswagen AG; Audi AG; Volkswagen Group of 
America, Inc.; Porsche AG; Porsche; and Porsche Cars North America, 
Inc., 2016) 
Image 6: Maura Healey, the Massachusetts attorney general, centre, with Eric Schneiderman, the New 
York attorney general, left. They, along with Maryland’s attorney general, filed lawsuits over 
Volkswagen’s emissions deception (Thomas, 2016). 
 
In the EU, in the wake of revelations that VW had used a "defeat device" to 
circumvent emissions standards for certain air pollutants, the EC called on national 
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authorities to look into the implications for vehicles sold in Europe and ensure that 
EU pollutant emission standards are scrupulously respected, owing to regulation 
Article 30(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC, as well as establishing EMIS. 
Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska (responsible for Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs) has succinctly outlined the EU institutional response: 
"Our message is clear: zero tolerance on fraud and rigorous compliance with EU 
rules. We need full disclosure and robust pollutant emissions tests in place" (EC, 
2015). 
 Now that the regulatory context in which the VW Scandal was able to occur is 
clear, this research paper will begin to evaluate the hypotheses, by identifying the 
three key events that explain how the different applications of PBR led to different 
responses to the VW Scandal. Before evaluating the hypotheses, we must reject the 
null hypothesis to demonstrate that there is some evidence of a relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables, and that the responses of the EU and U.S. 
can -at least partly- be explained by the different applications of PBR.  As a recap, the 
null hypothesis is as follows; 
 
Null Hypothesis – the different responses of the United States and the 
European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal cannot be explained as a 
result of the limitations of performance-based regulation 
 
The burden of evidence, from both independent organisations, such as the 
ICCT, as well as the regulatory authorities is that the regulatory frameworks can 
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largely explain responses to the VW Scandal. Without meaning to brush over the 
null hypothesis, it is clear from the literature review, regulatory context, and the 
burden of evidence that there is at least some explanatory relationship, the only 
contestation is “to what extent.” 
A PARADIGM SHIFT: REGULATION BY LITIGATION 
By tracing a process further back, we can increase the temporal range and level of 
analysis: this is why I will begin by arguing that the Consent Decrees in the Heavy-
Duty Vehicle industry (HDV) can help to explain why the U.S. developed a system 
different to the EU, which would later lead them to acting differently in the VW 
Scandal. 
 
In 1998, the USEPA sued the makers of more than 95 percent of the U.S. HDV 
engine manufacturers, after the discovery that a “defeat device” had been used in 
HDVs to increase fuel economy during nonurban driving conditions, resulting in 
higher NOx emissions. Although the engine manufacturers denied the USEPA’s claim 
that a “defeat device” was present, seven U.S. HDV engine manufacturers settled the 
enforcement actions by agreeing financial penalties of over $1 billion collectively 
(including an $83.4 million civil penalty, at the time the largest ever violation of 
environmental law), and to devote resources to developing clean technologies 
(Morriss, Yandle, & Dorchak, 2004). It is not a big leap to see the similarities 
between the Consent Decrees of the 1990s and the VW Scandal, as both contained 
examples of programming vehicles to keep NOx emissions low during certification, 
then switching to a fuel economy mode during normal driving. 
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The regulatory discontinuity that followed the HDV Consent Decrees led to a 
system that entrenched the USEPA’s enforcement capabilities, resulting in a 
regulation by litigation approach.14The shift to litigation was more than just an 
extension of previous enforcement tools, it was an internal change that moved the 
responsibility from program officials to the enforcement division (Morriss, Yandle, & 
Dorchak, 2004). In the VW Scandal context, whilst these Consent Decrees were in the 
HDV domain, rather than LDV, in discussion with a USEPA Director, he claimed that 
this HDV crisis affected future policy-making for LDV, beginning with Tier 2 (2004-
2009) vehicles, as well as in its response to the VW Scandal (US01).  
 
The Scandal in the U.S. also affected policy making in the EU, as stated by the 
commissioner for Enterprise and Industry (2004-2009) Günter Verheugen:  
 
“The Commission immediately prepared an amendment to Directive 
88/77/EC on emissions from Heavy Duty Vehicles introducing definitions 
and limitations of Defeat Device and Auxiliary Control Device (Commission 
Directive 2001/27/EC). For the Light Duty sector the concept and 
prohibition of defeat device was introduced already in Directive (EC) 
59/1998 (Euro 3 and 4 emission steps) and was further confirmed in 
Regulation (EC) No 715/2007” (EP, 2015). 
 
The Consent Decrees in the Heavy-Duty industry (HDV) can help to explain 
why the U.S. developed a system different to the EU, which would later lead them to 
acting differently in the VW Scandal. The paradigm shift to a regulatory structure 																																																								
14 Firms involved have paid or expect to pay huge fines and accepted new regulations as part of a 
settlement of litigation. (see (Morriss, Yandle, & Dorchak, 2004) 
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enshrined with enforcement created a path dependency that would be repeated in the 
VW Scandal. 
 
LEGAL LANGUAGE: “DEFEAT DEVICES” 
The HDV Scandal of the 1990s heavily influenced how the EU and U.S. 
systems regulated vehicle manufacturers, and subsequently in the development of 
their legal language. U.S. LDV regulation mirrored that of the HDV post Consent 
Decrees, as did the EU, as can be seen from the comments of Stavros Dimas, the EU 
Commissioner for the Environment, Climate Change and Civil Protection (2004-
2010) who stated that the instances of HDV defeat devices “have influenced us 
…provisions related to defeat devices and their ban was inspired by the US 
legislation” (EP, 2015).  
 
The U.S. definition for a “defeat device” can be found under (40 CFR §86.1803-01); 
 
“Defeat device means an auxiliary emission control device (AECD) that 
reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions 
which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle 
operation and use;” (GPO, 2011). 
 
With an AECD being: 
 
“…any element of design which senses temperature, vehicle speed, engine 
RPM, transmission gear, manifold vacuum, or any other parameter for the 
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purpose of activating, modulating, delaying, or deactivating the operation 
of any part of the emission control system. (GPO, 2011)” 
 
Moreover, defeat devices are explicitly forbidden: 
 
 “No new light-duty vehicle, light-duty truck, or complete heavy-duty 
vehicle shall be equipped with a defeat device” (GPO, 2011). 
 
The EU legislation -which is nearly identical- combines the definitions of an AECD 
and a “defeat device” into one comprehensive passage: 
 
“Any element of design which senses temperature, vehicle speed, engine 
speed (RPM), transmission gear, manifold vacuum or any other parameter 
for the purpose of activating, modulating, delaying or deactivating the 
operation of any part of the emission control system, that reduces the 
effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may 
reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and 
use;” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
2007). 
 
The differences between the EU and U.S. legal language for defeat devices are 
well explained by the ICCT, who suggest that “the language defining and prohibiting 
defeat devices in the U.S. and EU regulations is nearly identical...” with the 
differences being “minute and immaterial” (ICCT, 2015b). The principle difference 
between the two is how OEMs are penalised for failure to disclose AECDs or the 
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“defeat devices.” In the U.S. regulation, the USEPA may levy civil penalties of up to 
$37,500 per vehicle and $3,750 per sale of defeat device, whereas in the EU, the 
authority is left at the behest of the member states, who have been demonstrated to 
not adequately enforce (ICCT, 2016). Moreover, the EU regulation does not detail 
how AECDS should be implemented, again suggesting that it is the prerogative of the 
member states to “lay down the provisions on penalties applicable for infringement by 
manufacturers of the provisions of this Regulation and [to] take all measures 
necessary to ensure that they are implemented” (ICCT, 2015b). 
 
The comments from Paul Willis, managing director of VW UK, in response to 
Louise Ellman MP, Chair of the Parliament of the UK Transport Committee 
demonstrate the difference in response from VW in the EU and the U.S.: “…we do 
not think that it is possible to make the same legal determination in relation to the 
software that was fitted in the UK and the EU…” (Compared to the U.S.) (Willis, 
2015). This is in effect VW admitting that it installed an illegal defeat device in the 
U.S. but disputing that similar software constituted an illegal defeat device in the EU.   
 
 This difference in “comprehension” arose from the U.S.’ regulation by 
litigation approach, as VW did not immediately confess to having cheated in the U.S., 
and it was only when the USEPA threatened to withhold type approval for VW’s 
2016 diesel vehicles, that it admitted its faults (Vlasic & Kessler, 2015). It was the 
regulation by litigation approach that the U.S. developed following the 1990s Consent 




DISCOVERY BY ICCT AND WVU 
The previous two passages have demonstrated how the U.S. policy learning 
experience of the 1990s in the HDV consent decrees led to the U.S. developing a 
system of regulation by litigation. This was the beginning of the U.S. and the EU’s 
application of PBR diverging, as it led to the U.S. adopting stricter penalties 
(enforcement) for non-compliance. This next passage will largely assess the counter 
hypothesis, which as a reminder is: 
 
The different responses of the United States and the European Union to the 
Volkswagen Scandal can be explained as a result of their application of 
performance based regulation: specifically monitoring capabilities. 
 
If the differences responses of the EU and the U.S. to the VW Scandal were to 
explain be explained by their different monitoring capabilities, it would be expected 
that the EU and the U.S. regulatory authorities would uncover the Scandal differently. 
In this context, it was an interesting development that the VW Scandal was unearthed 
by the monitoring activities of an NGO (ICCT) and a research institute (WVU), rather 
than the monitoring efforts of the regulatory frameworks of the U.S. The U.S. having 
ISC –separating it from the EU’s monitoring capabilities in this respect- should have 
detected VW’s wrongdoings, if monitoring capabilities were to be the key 
explanatory variable. Whilst this could be considered as a form of “fire alarm” 
monitoring by the USEPA (rules, procedures, and informal practices that allow 
individuals or organised interest groups to monitor), I would argue that this does not 
take into account the origins of the research, as the trail began in the EU (with JRC 
studies), before being “exported” to WVU via the ICCT. 
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The reason for explaining the USEPA not discovering VW’s activities can be 
understood when one considers the size of the diesel fleet in the U.S. It makes sense 
that the USEPA, with a budget constraint, would not focus its energy on monitoring 
2% of the market (Crisp, 2016), whereas the diesel fleet constitutes over 50% of the 
EU fleet (ACEA, 2016). This understanding was echoed in comments with a USEPA 
Director, who suggested that VW slipped through USEPA net because it only a 
constituted a small percentage of the market (US01). Despite this, even if the chances 
of detection were far smaller, and the VW Scandal could have been detected by the 
USEPA, it should not detract from the fact that it was not detected, and that it was 
only when independent, third-party bodies detected inconsistencies, and passed over 
the information to the USEPA, that it acted. It is for these reasons that the different 
responses of the EU and the U.S. cannot be explained by their different applications 
of performance-based regulation: specifically monitoring. 
 
RENEWAL OR REFORM? REAL DRIVING EMISSIONS REGULATION 
EU member state investigations into the VW Scandal have highlighted the 
weaknesses in European regulations, with EU legislation subsequently being amended 
to much closer align with the U.S. (DoT, 2016). The migration of the main type 
approval emission tests from the NEDC to the worldwide harmonized light duty 
vehicles test procedure (WLTP)15, as well as the introduction of the Real Driving 
Emissions (RDE) –being introduced in 2017- test to supplement the laboratory 
measurements, demonstrates that the EU, unsatisfied with its inability to punish VW, 
																																																								
15 WLTP is a tougher assessment with higher speeds, and more accelerations. This tends to generate 
higher levels of pollutants such as NOx.  
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has positioned itself closer to the U.S. regulatory framework.16 The EU, by attempting 
to position itself closer to the U.S., and its regulation by litigation approach, is in 
essence accepting that its response to the VW Scandal was unsatisfactory, and that the 
U.S.’ approach has of regulation by litigation was better. Therefore, any evidence that 
the EU is developing enforcement mechanisms somewhat strengthen the hypothesis, 
albeit not substantially, as the changes have not been actualised as of yet. 
 
Whilst the RDE process had begun before the VW Scandal, its passage into law 
received much more attention as environmentalists pushed for stricter emissions 
limits17, and harsher penalties for noncompliance. The full requirements of RDE have 
not yet been fully defined as the regulatory process was split into four “packages” for 
practical reasons. The First and Second Packages have already been enshrined in 
European law.18 The Third19 and Fourth Package are yet to be legislated for fully, but 
are timetabled for an EC Technical Committee for Motor Vehicles (TCMV) vote in 
November 2016, with the view to be presented to the EP in early-2017. It is the 
outcome of the Fourth Package that is particularly interesting in the theme of this 
research, as in it the EC will define the rules for independent RDE testing of vehicles 
being in-service, including the regulatory consequences in the case of non 
compliance, and with suggestions that type approval withdrawal and fiscal penalties 
are on the table (EU01), this could provide significant ex post facto evidence to 
support the hypotheses that enforcement capabilities are the explanatory variable. 
																																																								16	Note that under the auspices of the USEPA 1065 regulation, PEMS ISC has been required since 
2007 for HDV. 17	For example in the conformity factors that have been agreed.  Conformity factors have been used in 
order to allow manufacturers to gradually adapt to the new testing rules (see ClientEarth, 2015)	
18 The First Package established the use of PEMS, and The Second Package focused on the impact of 
the type approval process at the member state level. 
19 The Third Package will define a procedure for the measurement of the particulates and include the 
effect of vehicle cold starts.	
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Conclusion 
In response to the research question - To what extent can the different responses of the 
United States and the European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal be explained by 
their different applications of performance-based regulation?- I would answer that 
the different responses of the EU and the U.S. can be explained to a great extent by 
their different applications of PBR.  By rejecting the null hypothesis due to the 
overwhelmingly body of evidence that suggested that there was a relationship 
between the independent and dependent variable, this research was able to analyse 
whether it was the application of enforcement mechanisms in PBR, or application of 
monitoring mechanism in PBR, that explained the different responses. 
 
The evidence tends to support the primary hypothesis; the different responses of 
the United States and the European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal can be 
explained as a result of their application of performance based regulation: 
specifically enforcement capabilities. Due to a process that began in the U.S. in the 
1990s. The paradigm shift in the U.S., resulting from the HDV Consent Decrees led 
to a system of regulation by litigation being developed, and an application of PBR 
centred on enforcement created a path dependency that would be repeated in the VW 
Scandal.  
 
 This difference was carried through into the legislation for “defeat devices”, 
meaning that despite the differences between the legal language of EU and U.S. being 
very similar, the U.S. was able to act, whereas the EU could not. VW did not 
immediately confess to having cheated in the U.S., it was only when the U.S. levied 
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its new approach and the USEPA threatened to withhold type approval for VW’s 
2016 diesel vehicles, that it admitted its faults. 
 
The discovery of the Scandal by parties external to the USEPA and the EU 
regulatory authorities critically damaged our counter hypothesis, as if the differences 
responses of the EU and the U.S. to the VW Scandal were to explain be explained by 
their different monitoring capabilities, it would be expected that the EU and the U.S. 
regulatory authorities would uncover the Scandal differently. 
 
Of course, this research does not suggest that the different responses of the EU 
and the U.S. to the VW Scandal can only be explained as a result of their application 
of PBR. Future research on this topic would benefit by looking deeper into the VW’s 
internal structure to understand more about its corporate culture. This would help the 
researcher to understand whether this case has high external validity, or whether it 
was a deviant case, and VW’s actions were instrumental in the different responses in 
the EU and the U.S. 
 
 This conclusion that the different responses of the United States and the 
European Union to the Volkswagen Scandal can be explained as a result of their 
application of performance based regulation: specifically enforcement capabilities has 
big consequences for future policy-making, as it suggests that enforcement 
capabilities are vital to ensure regulatory compliance. In attempt to remedy this 
deficiency, the next chapter (“Recommendations for the future”) will make some 
suggestions for how this capability-expectations gap can be reduced. 
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Recommendations For The Future 
 
“I am very concerned you (EU) don’t have one central office like the EPA 
where someone is responsible for making sure the companies follow the 
rules” (Crisp, 2016). – Margo Oge, USEPA Director, Office of 
Transportation and Air Quality (1994-2012). 
 
I will now make some recommendations based on the observations of this research, 
the policies that the EU have taken so far, and the current political climate, to ways in 
which the EU could strengthen its regulatory framework to prevent another VW 
Scandal happening in the future. 
 
Providing that RDE is fully transposed into EU law, it is worth noting that the 
full implications to OEMs with regards to future vehicle fleet composition (for 
example, electrification, vehicle and engine size) are yet to be fully understood. With 
state-of-the-art PEMS (with measurement errors approaching that attainable in 
traditional laboratory environments) the formal emission testing in laboratories may 
become obsolete. However, PEMS testing still requires significant “know-how” and 
relatively expensive equipment (ca 100k Euro per system) and cost estimates are in 
the region of 4,000-8,000 Euro per test. Consequently, the number of PEMS tests will 
still likely remain relatively small with respect to the vehicle population. An 
escalation mechanism would need to be in place to address failures since one test is 
unlikely to represent a legal-base for financial penalties.  
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The establishment of a central, independent authority, with punitive power (as 
in the U.S.) represents the ideal solution for the EU, however the current political 
climate would not permit such a pooling of sovereignty to Brussels, as Eurosceptic 
views dominate the political landscape (Brexit, need I say more). A more realistic 
target for European legislators should be to reform the current type approval 
procedure to make it more rigorous and transparent, including EU-wide oversight to 
make sure that the national testing TAA’s are adequately monitoring. In talking with 
U.S. interviewers, independence is critical. In the EU the use of TAA’s must 
eliminate, or at least mitigate conflicts of interests. To make these changes as 
effective as possible, the national TAA must be more willing to use the “stick” and 
financially punish non-compliers.  
 
The aims of these regulatory controls should not be forgotten: ambient air 
pollution is a serious health concern, and the EU and U.S. must be committed to 
challenging and incentivising industry to find innovative solutions to improve 
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APPENDIX D – WHICH CARS ARE AFFECTED? 
 
 
                    Jetta 2009 to 2015                      Beetle 2012 to 2015 
 
 
                   Passat 2012 to 2015                             Jetta SportWagen 2009 to 2014 
 
 






                                                  
 
                                                        Golf SportWagen 2015 
 
(Gates, Ewing, Russell, & Watkins, 2016) 
 
 
VW only, not including other VW AG vehicles (Audi A3 2010 to 2015; A6 Quattro 
2014 to 2016; Audi A7 Quattro 2014 to 2016; Audi A8 and A8L 2014 to 2016; Audi 
Q5 2014 to 2016; Audi Q7 2009 to 2016; Porsche Cayenne 2013 to 2016) 	
